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Introduction: This section extends the ongoing corruption and state capture investigation by examining President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s regional political and business networks from 2017 to 2025. Since taking power in the November 2017 coup, Mnangagwa has cultivated an extensive web of alliances, economic ventures, and illicit dealings that span across Southern Africa and beyond. We document his role in the 1990s Congo war economy, post-2017 international business deals and asset movements, offshore investments, and the network of family members and business proxies who facilitate his influence. We also identify the countries acting as his allies or enablers. Detailed sources and an illustrative network map are provided to show the cross-border links tying Mnangagwa to businesses and international actors.
DRC War Legacies: Mnangagwa’s 1990s Exploits
Mnangagwa’s regional network has roots in Zimbabwe’s intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during the Second Congo War (1998–2003). As a top official under Robert Mugabe, Mnangagwa was a key architect of Zimbabwe’s military and economic foray into the DRC, which was marked by illicit resource exploitation. A United Nations Panel of Experts report in 2002 identified Mnangagwa – then Speaker of Parliament and a former security minister – as the “key strategist” behind Zimbabwe’s business operations in the DRC (Mnangagwa, Moyo and Shiri involved in DRC plunder – UN report - Zimbabwe Situation). Under his guidance, Zimbabwe’s military and ruling elite secured lucrative mining and logging concessions in exchange for propping up Laurent Kabila’s regime.
COSLEG Joint Venture: Zimbabwe’s army established a joint venture with Kabila’s government known as COSLEG (a partnership between the Zimbabwe Defense Forces’ company OSLEG and DRC’s state company COMIEX). Through COSLEG, Zimbabwean military-linked firms exploited diamonds (notably in DRC’s Kasaï region), timber, and even ran a bank (Mnangagwa, Moyo and Shiri involved in DRC plunder – UN report - Zimbabwe Situation) (Mnangagwa, Moyo and Shiri involved in DRC plunder – UN report - Zimbabwe Situation). Mnangagwa, as Justice Minister at the time, personally visited DRC mining areas to oversee these business interests (In the DRC, an ugly history of war risks repeating itself – The Mail & Guardian). This arrangement essentially turned the conflict into a profit venture for Zimbabwe’s elite, with the army and connected businessmen mining diamonds and extracting other resources under the cover of the war.
Billy Rautenbach & DRC Mining: A prominent figure in Mnangagwa’s DRC network was Zimbabwean businessman Billy Rautenbach, one of Mnangagwa’s close allies. Backed by Harare, Rautenbach was installed by Kabila’s government as the head of Gécamines (the DRC’s state mining company) from 1998 to 2000 (Digging for Dirt in the DRC? | corpwatch). During that period, Rautenbach (often acting as a proxy for Zimbabwean interests) controlled rich copper and cobalt concessions. A UN inquiry later reported that Zimbabwean military officials and their business partners – including Rautenbach – engaged in “asset-stripping joint ventures” with Congolese state companies (Mnangagwa, Moyo and Shiri involved in DRC plunder – UN report - Zimbabwe Situation). When Congolese authorities tried to oust Rautenbach amid disputes over missing payments, Mnangagwa and other Zimbabwean power brokers intervened to protect these profitable arrangements (Mnangagwa, Moyo and Shiri involved in DRC plunder – UN report - Zimbabwe Situation) (Mnangagwa, Moyo and Shiri involved in DRC plunder – UN report - Zimbabwe Situation).
In sum, Mnangagwa’s role in the DRC war laid the foundation for his regional economic network. The war enabled Zimbabwe’s political-military elites (Mnangagwa chief among them) to amass offshore wealth – from diamonds, gold, timber and cobalt – through covert partnerships. By 2002, the UN Panel concluded that this network of Zimbabwean officials and companies had entrenched itself in the DRC’s economy, continuing to run “lucrative businesses” even after active combat ended (Mnangagwa, Moyo and Shiri involved in DRC plunder – UN report - Zimbabwe Situation). This legacy of resource plunder and military-commercial ventures would foreshadow Mnangagwa’s later use of regional business networks to enrich his circle.
Post-2017 Cross-Border Deals and Visits
After assuming the presidency in late 2017, Mnangagwa launched a diplomatic and economic charm offensive across the region. His mantra of being “open for business” saw him shuttling to numerous countries to court investors and strike deals, while also quietly moving assets abroad. Between December 2017 and mid-2018, Mnangagwa visited over a dozen countries, underscoring the new regime’s foreign outreach (Mnangagwa to notch 26th foreign trip as pressure grows at home) (Russian FM Makes Deals, Affirms Old Friendships on Africa Tour). Key regional engagements include:
Kenya: Mnangagwa made state visits to Kenya to deepen ties and seek investment. In March 2022, he met then-President Uhuru Kenyatta in Nairobi and signed a series of bilateral agreements and Memoranda of Understanding aimed at boosting trade and cooperation (Zim, Kenya sign eight MoUs - Harare - The Sunday Mail). These deals covered areas such as agriculture, mining, and tourism. While largely framed as normal bilateral commerce, there are indications that Zimbabwe’s elite also see Kenya as a gateway for moving capital. (For example, Kenyan financial institutions have expanded into Zimbabwe and vice versa (In the DRC, an ugly history of war risks repeating itself – The Mail & Guardian), suggesting growing financial linkages.) Thus far, these visits have produced diplomatic goodwill and promises more than tangible investments. However, they signal Mnangagwa’s intent to forge alliances in East Africa that could potentially facilitate business or serve as safe havens.
Tanzania and Mozambique: Mnangagwa has cultivated especially warm relations with fellow former liberation movements in Tanzania and Mozambique. He held several meetings with Tanzania’s leadership (late President John Magufuli and his successor Samia Suluhu) to strengthen political ties and discuss joint infrastructure projects. With Mozambique, Mnangagwa’s focus has been on energy and transport corridors. In 2018, he explored a proposal to build a second oil pipeline from the Mozambican port of Beira to Zimbabwe ( Mnangagwa wants his pipeline | Article Preview | Africa Confidential) ( Mnangagwa wants his pipeline | Article Preview | Africa Confidential). This was aimed at breaking the near-monopoly of the commodity giant Trafigura over Zimbabwe’s fuel supply. (Trafigura, via its partnership with Mnangagwa’s ally Kudakwashe Tagwirei, had long controlled the existing Beira-Feruka pipeline.) Although the new pipeline project stalled, Zimbabwe and Mozambique did agree to collaborate on other trade and power-generation deals. Frequent visits and personal rapport with President Filipe Nyusi have made Mozambique one of Mnangagwa’s closest regional partners – crucial for access to ports and as a transit route for commodities (both legal and illicit, such as smuggled gold or cash).
Other African Partners: Mnangagwa also increased state visits to and from Angola, Namibia, Botswana, and South Africa, mainly to solidify support within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). He signed investment agreements with Botswana and Namibia and engaged South African businesses to reinvest in Zimbabwe. Notably, South Africa’s government has maintained cordial relations and refrained from criticizing Harare, focusing instead on economic cooperation. This regional diplomatic offensive provided Mnangagwa cover and legitimacy—SADC and the African Union largely treated his government as legitimate despite the military’s role in his rise (Is Zimbabwe facing another November 2017? - Daily Maverick). (Indeed, neither SADC nor the AU took punitive action after the November 2017 coup, implicitly accepting the power transition (Is Zimbabwe facing another November 2017? - Daily Maverick).)
Asia and the Middle East (China, UAE): Beyond Africa, Mnangagwa pivoted strongly to non-Western allies. China was the destination of his first state visit outside Africa (April 2018), where he thanked President Xi Jinping for China’s “political support and goodwill” during Zimbabwe’s transition (Mnangagwa has first state visit to China since taking office this is ...). China pledged financial support and has since invested in Zimbabwe’s mining (diamonds, lithium) and infrastructure projects. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) quickly became one of Zimbabwe’s most important economic partners under Mnangagwa. Over the past six years, Mnangagwa frequently courted the UAE as an alternative source of investment and market for gold. By 2023–24 he was meeting regularly with Dubai’s Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (DMCC) to integrate Zimbabwe into Dubai’s gold and commodities trading hub (The Chronicle - Breaking news) (The Chronicle - Breaking news). In February 2024, while visiting Dubai, Mnangagwa openly stated that Zimbabwe would “focus trade on regions with no quarrel with us” like the UAE, given that Western nations maintain sanctions (The Chronicle - Breaking news). The UAE has no sanctions on Zimbabwe and has effectively offered Harare a lifeline by buying Zimbabwean gold and facilitating other trade (The Chronicle - Breaking news) (The Chronicle - Breaking news). This “Look East” (and Gulf) strategy – deepening ties with China, the UAE, and other friendly states – has been vital for Mnangagwa’s regime to access capital, move money, and gain diplomatic protection amid its estrangement from the West (Vineet on X: "https://t.co/rpTPNP4Pmr Zimbabwean President ...).
Asset Movements: Alongside these visits, there are signs of asset movements and deal-making by Mnangagwa’s cronies in the region. For instance, soon after 2017, entities linked to Mnangagwa’s allies started registering companies in Mauritius, the Cayman Islands, and other offshore jurisdictions (detailed in the next section). There were also spikes in high-value purchases abroad by Zimbabwean elites (real estate in South Africa and Dubai, luxury goods, etc.), suggesting capital flight. While exact details of Mnangagwa’s personal travels for business are closely guarded, it’s known that he and his family members made frequent private trips to destinations like Dubai, China, and South Africa under the pretext of medical care or international forums – trips often coinciding with rumored business negotiations or asset relocation. In summary, since 2017 Mnangagwa has actively built transnational channels – both diplomatic and clandestine – to sustain his regime’s finances. His whirlwind of foreign visits yielded a patchwork of bilateral agreements and opened pathways for moving Zimbabwe’s wealth across borders.
Offshore Investments and Hidden Assets (2017–2025)
Despite public claims of reform, Mnangagwa’s presidency has been characterized by the entrenchment of offshore shell companies, secret investments, and asset shuffling across jurisdictions. Much of the wealth generated by corrupt deals in Zimbabwe is siphoned abroad by his close associates – shielding it from public scrutiny and future political risk. Notably, several revelations since 2019 have exposed how Mnangagwa’s business proxies use offshore structures to hide assets acquired under his administration.
Kudakwashe Tagwirei’s Offshore Empire: Perhaps the clearest example of offshore dealings involves Kudakwashe Tagwirei, a tycoon and presidential adviser considered one of Mnangagwa’s key financial conduits. Tagwirei has been accused of massive corruption in Zimbabwe (fuel procurement scams, subsidized agriculture funds, mining deals) and was sanctioned by the U.S. and U.K. in 2020 for graft (Treasury Sanctions Corrupt Zimbabwean Businessman | U.S. Department of the Treasury) (Treasury Sanctions Corrupt Zimbabwean Businessman | U.S. Department of the Treasury). Rather than curtailing his activities, Tagwirei reorganized his business empire internationally. Investigations by The Sentry found that “Tagwirei used complex corporate structures to build and hide his wealth,” often hiding behind offshore companies in Mauritius and the Cayman Islands (Shadows and Shell Games - The Sentry). For example, he funneled money through a Mauritius-registered firm called Sotic International (run by Mauritius-based directors) to purchase major mining assets (Fact Sheet English: Fronts, Fakes, and Façades) (Fact Sheet English: Fronts, Fakes, and Façades). In 2019, Tagwirei moved millions of dollars from Zimbabwe’s central bank into London accounts to buy two mines (Bindura Nickel and Freda Rebecca gold mine) via this offshore network (Fact Sheet English: Fronts, Fakes, and Façades). The payments were structured in stages and involved trade misinvoicing and shell firms to disguise the source of funds (Fact Sheet English: Fronts, Fakes, and Façades) (Fact Sheet English: Fronts, Fakes, and Façades). In the final stage, Tagwirei routed $8.7 million through a Cayman Islands vehicle, creating an “offshore façade” that obscured his involvement (Fact Sheet English: Fronts, Fakes, and Façades). All the while, Tagwirei himself stayed off record – allowing Mnangagwa’s government to claim that a “foreign investor” (Sotic) was buying the mines, when in fact it was the President’s crony using laundered local funds. These maneuvers highlight how Mnangagwa’s circle externalizes illicit wealth: domestic plunder is converted into offshore investments. (Figure: Tagwirei controlled over 40 companies, with significant stakes in gold, nickel, platinum and fuel ventures, hidden behind front men and offshore registries (Shadows and Shell Games - The Sentry).)
Other Offshore Holdings: Apart from the Tagwirei network, there are indications of Mnangagwa-linked assets in Dubai and Hong Kong (continuing a trend from Mugabe-era elites). Unconfirmed reports have pointed to properties in Dubai owned through intermediaries, as the emirate has become a favored haven for Zimbabwe’s ruling class to park wealth (helped by lax financial transparency). In late 2023, a Bloomberg report noted that Mnangagwa’s years of courting the UAE paid off as the UAE became a critical outlet for Zimbabwe’s gold and a possible destination for its elite’s funds (Vineet on X: "https://t.co/rpTPNP4Pmr Zimbabwean President ...). Mauritius and Seychelles have also been used as offshore banking and incorporation centers for Zimbabwean business entities post-2017. For example, leaked documents in 2020 (the “Pandora Papers” and others) revealed that some Zimbabwean political figures and their families had trusts and shell companies in these islands, though Mnangagwa’s name did not appear directly – a sign that he likely relies on trusted proxies to hold assets on his behalf.
State-Owned Companies as Fronts: Since becoming President, Mnangagwa has also overseen the creation of ostensibly state-owned enterprises that quietly harbor private interests. A case in point is Kuvimba Mining House, a mining conglomerate set up in 2020 and claimed by the finance ministry to be majority-owned by the government. Investigative reports, however, allege that Tagwirei and possibly other regime figures hold hidden stakes in Kuvimba via nominee companies (Shadows and Shell Games - The Sentry). Such structures blur the line between public assets and Mnangagwa’s patronage network. Similarly, the new sovereign wealth vehicle Mutapa Investment Fund (launched in 2023) took over formerly public assets, and opposition figures raised concerns that this could be used to mask transfers of wealth to ruling party elites in offshore deals ([PDF] $1.6 Billion Paid to Mystery Shareholders by Zimbabwe Sovereign ...).
Family Members’ Assets: Members of Mnangagwa’s family have also established businesses and acquired assets that extend beyond Zimbabwe’s borders. His twin sons (Sean and Collins Mnangagwa) and younger son Emmerson Jr. have been involved in various ventures – from fuel supply contracts to mining and construction – often in partnership with foreign investors. Collins Mnangagwa has been linked to commodity trading companies that operate in neighboring Mozambique and South Africa, while Emmerson Jr. reportedly has acted as a liaison for Chinese investors and occasionally represents his father in business discussions abroad. In one telling incident, a veteran gold dealer recounted that Mnangagwa’s son (Emmerson Jr.) gave him the President’s own gold Rolex watch to settle a debt – indicating the level of financial entanglement between the First Family and smugglers (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera). First Lady Auxillia Mnangagwa has also traveled frequently to Asia and the Middle East on charitable pretexts, raising speculation that she may be scouting safe locations for family assets. (Notably, Auxillia was contacted directly by conspirators in a money laundering deal – described later – which suggests she plays an active role in the family’s financial dealings (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera).)
In summary, Mnangagwa’s reign has internationalized the fruits of corruption. Through front companies in Mauritius, bank accounts in London and Dubai, and investments hidden under associates’ names, a significant portion of the regime’s wealth has been moved offshore since 2017. This not only enriches Mnangagwa’s network but also protects those assets from any local accountability. As detailed next, many of the key figures moving this money are Mnangagwa’s long-time friends, family, and partners.
Key Business Proxies and Family Networks
Mnangagwa relies on a close-knit group of businessmen and relatives to conduct deals and hold assets across borders. These individuals – often referred to in Zimbabwe as “the cartels” – act as the pillars of his state-capture network, extending its reach into foreign markets. Below we profile several of the most prominent figures and their cross-border links:
Kudakwashe Tagwirei (“Queen Bee”): Tagwirei is arguably Mnangagwa’s top business ally and financier. As noted, he amassed a fortune through fuel imports (via his company Sakunda Holdings) and command agriculture programs during Mnangagwa’s tenure. Tagwirei’s importance lies in his regional financial maneuvers. In addition to the offshore web described earlier, Tagwirei partnered with the multinational Trafigura to dominate Zimbabwe’s fuel supply since 2013 (How a Zimbabwe Tycoon Made a Fortune from a Trafigura Partnership and Spiralling National Debt | OCCRP). Reports show he earned at least $100 million in fees from this partnership (How a Zimbabwe Tycoon Made a Fortune from a Trafigura Partnership and Spiralling National Debt | OCCRP), while Trafigura extended about $1 billion in loans to Zimbabwe’s government at high interest (How a Zimbabwe Tycoon Made a Fortune from a Trafigura Partnership and Spiralling National Debt | OCCRP) – indebting the country but enriching Tagwirei’s network. When scrutiny increased, Tagwirei shifted assets to Mauritius, as mentioned, and even secured a new fuel supply deal via a Mauritian entity (How a Zimbabwe Tycoon Made a Fortune from a Trafigura Partnership and Spiralling National Debt | OCCRP). He also invested in mining ventures with foreign partners: e.g. a major platinum project (Great Dyke Investments) in joint venture with Russia’s Vi Holding/JSC Afromet. In that deal, Tagwirei’s company Landela secretly bought a 50% stake by paying $21 million to a Zimbabwean military company – an off-budget transaction raising concerns of kickbacks to the army (Shadows and Shell Games - The Sentry). Tagwirei’s expansive network (spanning Singapore, Mauritius, UK, Cayman Islands, South Africa and more) provides Mnangagwa a financial umbilical cord to the outside world. U.S. officials even described Mnangagwa as having “benefited from [Tagwirei’s] corrupt network” and receiving luxury gifts (like expensive cars) from him in exchange for state favors (Treasury Sanctions Corrupt Zimbabwean Businessman | U.S. Department of the Treasury) (Treasury Sanctions Corrupt Zimbabwean Businessman | U.S. Department of the Treasury). In effect, Tagwirei operates as Mnangagwa’s offshore banker and fixer, moving money and arranging deals far beyond Zimbabwe’s borders.
Billy Rautenbach: An erstwhile ally from the DRC days, Billy Rautenbach remains a key figure in Mnangagwa’s business network. After a period of exile and legal troubles (he was wanted in South Africa on fraud charges in the 2000s), Rautenbach returned to favor in Zimbabwe around the time of Mnangagwa’s rise. He controls major assets such as Green Fuel (an ethanol plant and sugarcane estate in southeastern Zimbabwe) and has interests in mining. Rautenbach’s regional influence is notable: he reportedly retains mining stakes in the DRC and has business operations in Zambia, Mozambique, and South Africa. In Mozambique, for example, his company had a stake in a logistics corridor; in DRC, he formerly held cobalt mining concessions. Rautenbach was named in the Panama Papers leaks, suggesting he too utilized offshore vehicles. While not officially part of government, he is widely believed to finance ZANU-PF and to have been one of the secret funders of the 2017 coup that brought Mnangagwa to power. His clout is such that in 2019, Mnangagwa’s government quietly awarded Rautenbach’s company a license for a large platinum concession, and there were discussions of Rautenbach spearheading a revival of a defunct steel plant with foreign investment. Rautenbach’s long history of straddling the legal and illicit — from running Gécamines in the DRC (DRC : KABILA AND RAUTENBACH FALL OUT - 14/07/1999 - Africa Energy Intelligence) to allegedly smuggling minerals — makes him an archetypal “politically-exposed businessman” in Mnangagwa’s network, operating at the intersection of state interests and personal profit across borders.
Uebert Angel: “Prophet” Uebert Angel (born Uebert Madzanire) is a preacher-turned-businessman whom Mnangagwa appointed Ambassador-at-Large to Europe and the Americas in 2021. Despite his religious title, Angel has emerged as a crucial frontman for Mnangagwa in clandestine gold trading and money laundering schemes. In early 2023, Al Jazeera’s undercover “Gold Mafia” investigation filmed Angel offering to launder $1.2 billion for supposed Chinese criminals via gold smuggling (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera). Angel explicitly told the undercover team that “Number One” (Mnangagwa) was aware of the plan, and he even dialed Auxillia Mnangagwa (the First Lady) on speakerphone to vouch for the deal (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera) (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera). He described Mnangagwa as “the guy who gives the final say” and sought a $200,000 kickback to arrange a meeting with the President (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera) (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera). Angel’s international connections – he is based in the UK and frequently in Dubai – make him an ideal agent to recruit buyers for smuggled Zimbabwean gold. Under diplomatic cover, Angel can carry large sums and gold without customs scrutiny. His role in the network is to facilitate the laundering of funds from overseas back to Zimbabwe (through gold deliveries), while assuring foreign criminals of protection from the very top. This was dramatically illustrated when Angel said any payment to Mnangagwa should be seen not as a bribe but as a token of appreciation – claiming “that guy doesn’t take bribes… he won’t” even as he solicited the money (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera). (In reality, as multiple smugglers attested, Mnangagwa provides the protective shield to gold smugglers in exchange for a cut (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera) (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera).) Following the Al Jazeera exposé, there were calls to fire and prosecute Angel, but Mnangagwa did not publicly reprimand him – a sign of how integral Angel is to the President’s covert economic agenda.
Henrietta Rushwaya and the Gold Smuggling Syndicate: Rushwaya is Mnangagwa’s niece (often described as his “relative”) and serves as President of the Zimbabwe Miners Federation. She was arrested in 2020 trying to smuggle 6kg of gold in her hand luggage to Dubai, a case that was later swept under the rug. In the Gold Mafia tapes, Rushwaya appears as a ready collaborator, outlining an elaborate laundering scheme involving funneling dirty cash into Zimbabwe via gold deals (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera). Essentially, she offered to ensure a steady supply of gold from artisanal miners which could be sold for clean money. Rushwaya’s involvement demonstrates the family link in Mnangagwa’s criminal network – she leverages her official position to enable illicit trade, confident that her uncle’s regime will protect her. Another gold smuggler, Ewan Macmillan, who has been in the gold trade since the 1990s, bluntly said that Mnangagwa was “once my partner” in looting resources and had warned him not to talk: “He was my partner… He said to me, don’t open your mouth. Your life will get worse” (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera). Macmillan’s claims (corroborated by his continued friendship with Mnangagwa’s son and possession of Mnangagwa’s personal watch (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera)) underscore that figures like him and Rushwaya are long-time collaborators in the looting of gold and diamonds – operating within Zimbabwe and funneling profits abroad with Mnangagwa’s blessing.
Other notable enablers include Delish Nguwaya, an associate who fronted a dodgy medical supply deal with a foreign company in 2020, and Obert Mpofu, a former minister who accumulated vast wealth (including properties in South Africa and possibly Asia) while loyal to Mnangagwa. Even elements of the military and intelligence services form part of the network – for instance, Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation was implicated in the smuggling rings, and military bosses partner in mining ventures (often through companies like Rusununguko or Zimbabwe Defence Industries). All these individuals form a nexus of political and business interests that spans borders. They channel resources out of Zimbabwe, invest or stash them in friendly countries, and can call upon political connections in those countries when needed.
Friendly Nations and Political Protectors
Despite international criticism, Mnangagwa’s regime survives in part due to support (tacit or overt) from certain foreign governments. These alliances provide diplomatic cover, economic lifelines, and legitimacy. Key among them are:
China: Beijing has been a long-standing ally of Zimbabwe and immediately embraced Mnangagwa after the 2017 coup. China sent a high-level envoy to Harare to bless the new administration, and Mnangagwa’s first non-African trip was to China where President Xi Jinping hailed a “new chapter” in ties (Mnangagwa Visit Marks New Era In Zimbabwe, China Relations). China views Zimbabwe as a strategic partner – it has substantial mining investments (e.g. in diamonds, chrome, lithium) and has granted loans for infrastructure. In return, Mnangagwa has often praised China’s support and defended Chinese interests in Zimbabwe. China consistently backs Zimbabwe in international forums, opposing Western sanctions and interference. This relationship, forged during the liberation war, now manifests as China acting as a political shield for Mnangagwa’s regime. Chinese entities (some state-linked) have also been accused of providing surveillance technology to Zimbabwe’s security forces, aiding Mnangagwa’s domestic clampdowns. In short, China is both an investor and a protector, ensuring Zimbabwe is not isolated globally.
Russia: Mnangagwa has deepened ties with Russia, aligning with Moscow’s geopolitical stance. He has called President Vladimir Putin “my dear brother” and lauded Russia as a “consistent global ally” of Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe's Mnangagwa hails Russia's Putin as 'my dear friend' and ally | Reuters) (Zimbabwe's Mnangagwa hails Russia's Putin as 'my dear friend' and ally | Reuters). In June 2023, standing beside Putin at a forum, Mnangagwa condemned Western “hegemonic tendencies” and thanked Russia for defending Zimbabwe’s sovereignty (Zimbabwe's Mnangagwa hails Russia's Putin as 'my dear friend' and ally | Reuters). Russia, which has been under its own Western sanctions, finds common cause with sanctioned Zimbabwe. It has signed military and economic cooperation agreements – including deals for a Russian firm (Alrosa) to mine diamonds, and the joint platinum project mentioned earlier. Notably, Zimbabwe abstained or voted with Russia on UN resolutions regarding the Ukraine conflict, reflecting this political loyalty. There are also reports of private Russian entities (potentially including Wagner-linked groups) exploring mining concessions in Zimbabwe. Russia provides diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council (where it, along with China, has historically vetoed punitive resolutions on Zimbabwe). For Mnangagwa, having powerful friends in Moscow means an added layer of immunity from international pressure.
Southern African Neighbors (SADC): Many of Mnangagwa’s neighbors have acted as de facto guarantors of his regime’s stability. South Africa, the regional powerhouse, has taken a soft approach – President Cyril Ramaphosa has frequently called for lifting sanctions on Zimbabwe and for respecting its sovereignty, rather than pressuring Mnangagwa on reforms. South Africa and Zimbabwe’s ruling parties (ANC and ZANU-PF) share liberation movement ties, and this solidarity often translates to diplomatic protection. Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, and Tanzania similarly have been supportive or neutral. In fact, SADC as a bloc designated October 25 as “Anti-Sanctions Day” to collectively denounce Western sanctions on Zimbabwe ( Zimbabwean president urges removal of U.S.-imposed sanctions-Xinhua ) ( Zimbabwean president urges removal of U.S.-imposed sanctions-Xinhua ). In 2024, Mnangagwa became the Chair of SADC, illustrating his acceptance by fellow African leaders ( Zimbabwean president urges removal of U.S.-imposed sanctions-Xinhua ). While there have been moments of concern – e.g. after Zimbabwe’s disputed 2018 and 2023 elections, Botswana and Zambia voiced some criticism – SADC has not taken any punitive action. It did not intervene against the 2017 military takeover, nor the violent crackdowns on protesters in 2019 and 2020 (Is Zimbabwe facing another November 2017? - Daily Maverick). This regional stance effectively insulates Mnangagwa: any internal opposition knows that neighboring governments will not support efforts to unseat him undemocratically. Furthermore, countries like South Africa provide an economic safety valve (millions of Zimbabweans have migrated there, easing pressure on Mnangagwa, and South African banks quietly handle transactions for Zimbabwean elites). In essence, SADC’s public posture is that Zimbabwe’s issues are an internal matter – a critical diplomatic shield for Mnangagwa.
The United Arab Emirates: Though not a “political” ally in the traditional sense, the UAE has become an economic ally and enabler of Mnangagwa’s regime. As noted, Dubai’s gold market is a major destination for Zimbabwean gold – much of it illicitly mined or smuggled. The UAE’s willingness to buy gold with minimal questions asked has helped Zimbabwe weather its currency crises (by bringing in much-needed USD liquidity, albeit off-book). Mnangagwa has cultivated a personal relationship with UAE leaders; the UAE invited him for Expo 2020 and has mooted investments in Zimbabwe’s energy sector. This relationship paid dividends when Emirati entities showed interest in Zimbabwe’s new Victoria Falls Stock Exchange and offshore financial center, potentially turning Zimbabwe into “Africa’s Dubai” in finance (Zimbabwe looks to become Africa's Dubai with offshore financial ...). Also, high-profile visits (like Mnangagwa meeting UAE royal family members and business magnates) signal that the UAE could offer the First Family safe harbor for assets if needed. In return, Zimbabwe has granted UAE companies favorable deals (rumors include concessions in gold refining and minerals marketing). The UAE thus functions as a critical economic protector, giving Mnangagwa’s circle access to global markets and luxury lifestyle in a friendly jurisdiction.
Others: Mnangagwa has also maintained friendly ties with Belarus (whose president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, sold agricultural machinery and possibly arms to Zimbabwe) and Turkey, among others. These relationships diversify his international support. Even Western nations initially gave Mnangagwa a chance – for instance, Britain and the EU warmed up in 2018 hoping for reforms. However, as repression continued, Western sanctions on Mnangagwa and his cronies were re-imposed. (In March 2023, the U.S. Treasury refocused its sanctions specifically on Mnangagwa’s “criminal network of officials and businesspeople” facilitating corruption (Treasury Sanctions Zimbabwe’s President and Key Actors for Corruption and Serious Human Rights Abuse | U.S. Department of the Treasury) (Treasury Sanctions Zimbabwe’s President and Key Actors for Corruption and Serious Human Rights Abuse | U.S. Department of the Treasury). The U.S. designated Mnangagwa under the Global Magnitsky Act for engaging in corrupt activities, including “gold and diamond smuggling networks” and the taking of bribes (Treasury Sanctions Zimbabwe’s President and Key Actors for Corruption and Serious Human Rights Abuse | U.S. Department of the Treasury).) In contrast, no such censure has come from his allies in Asia, the Middle East, or Africa.
In summary, a constellation of countries – from regional neighbors to great powers like China/Russia and economic hubs like the UAE – serve as Mnangagwa’s lifelines. They either actively defend his government on the world stage, or passively enable his financial networks to thrive. This support severely blunts the effectiveness of international isolation and allows Mnangagwa to play one side against another (for example, leveraging China/Russia/UAE support to counterbalance Western pressure). It also means that his regime, despite its pariah status in some quarters, is far from alone – it is enmeshed in a global web of alliances that help sustain Zimbabwe’s kleptocratic status quo.
Cross-Border Network Map: Businesses, Countries & Individuals
Mnangagwa’s influence flows through a sprawling transnational network of corporations, intermediaries, and power brokers. The diagram below illustrates some of the key connections between Mnangagwa (“Number One”) and his international enablers uncovered in recent investigations:
(Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera) Infographic: Mnangagwa’s “Gold Mafia” network, as exposed by Al Jazeera in 2023. Multiple smugglers and proxies (circles) link back to Mnangagwa at the center, indicating how the President provides protection and direction for cross-border gold smuggling and money laundering schemes (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera) (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera). Figures like Ambassador Uebert Angel and Henrietta Rushwaya (top right) arrange laundering of foreign cash into gold with Mnangagwa’s knowledge (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera), while smugglers like Ewan Macmillan, Alistair Mathias, and Kamlesh Pattni (bottom) claim partnership with or direct access to Mnangagwa (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera). Even First Lady Auxillia (bottom right) was involved in communications, underscoring the family’s role (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera).
As shown above, gold smugglers from various countries connect directly to Mnangagwa’s circle. For instance, Kenyan trader Kamlesh Pattni (infamous from Kenya’s 1990s “Goldenberg” scandal) relocated to Dubai and works with Zimbabwe’s gold smugglers, boasting of text messages with Mnangagwa and showing off apparent direct communications (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera) (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera). Another dealer, Alistair Mathias (a gold broker with clients in the UAE and India), told undercover reporters that Mnangagwa was his “partner” in Zimbabwe deals (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera). These claims reinforce that Mnangagwa sits at the apex of an international smuggling web that moves gold (and likely diamonds) from Zimbabwe to markets in the UAE, with money looping back to the pockets of the Zimbabwean elites.
Beyond the gold mafia, Mnangagwa’s cross-border network can be mapped as follows:
Illicit Gold/Diamond Supply Chain: Zimbabwean miners and smugglers → Proxies: Henrietta Rushwaya, Ewan Macmillan, Pattni, Mathias, and Uebert Angel → Destination: Dubai (UAE) gold market. Connection to Mnangagwa: He provides the “license” for these operations – multiple smugglers confirmed that nothing moves without ED’s approval, and he ensures immunity for the networks (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera). In return, cash is delivered to Mnangagwa or laundered into his projects. This supply chain extends to South Africa and Mozambique as transit routes (smugglers often move bullion through these neighbors). It’s essentially a cross-border organized crime network protected at the highest level.
Offshore Finance & Investments: Corrupt earnings from Zimbabwe (e.g. from inflated state contracts, mining revenues, or central bank siphoning) → Front Companies: Tagwirei’s Sotic Intl (Mauritius), various shell companies in Seychelles/Cayman/etc. → Investments: real assets abroad (mines in Africa, properties in London or Dubai, bank deposits). Connection to Mnangagwa: These front companies are controlled by his confidants (like Tagwirei) who later quietly repatriate benefits to the elite. Example: In 2019, millions of dollars were moved from Zimbabwe’s Reserve Bank to London via Mauritius to buy gold and nickel mines, all orchestrated by Tagwirei while he was an official presidential adviser (Fact Sheet English: Fronts, Fakes, and Façades) (Fact Sheet English: Fronts, Fakes, and Façades). The purchase was done in the name of a “neutral” company to hide the true beneficiary – widely suspected to be Tagwirei and by extension the Zimbabwean elite. Such maneuvers effectively transfer national wealth into private offshore hands.
DRC and Regional Resource Deals: Legacy joint ventures (like COSLEG) and individual businessmen (like Rautenbach) → Foreign operations: mining in DRC, farming in Zambia/Mozambique, logistics companies, etc. → Profits: shared between Zimbabwean power brokers and local partners. Connection to Mnangagwa: He either helped establish these deals (in the DRC war era) or currently leverages them. For example, even in the 2020s Mnangagwa has revisited DRC relations – Zimbabwe has demanded compensation for its DRC war expenditures and seeks new mining opportunities there (DRC conflict comes back to haunt Zimbabwe - The Zimbabwean). Close allies like Rautenbach position themselves to benefit if such deals materialize. Essentially, Mnangagwa’s regime maintains a sphere of economic influence in the region, especially where unstable conditions (like eastern DRC) allow politically-connected actors to swoop in.
Allied Governments & “Safe” Jurisdictions: Mnangagwa and his ministers → Friendly capitals: Beijing, Moscow, Pretoria, Abu Dhabi, etc. → Support: loans, investments, or diplomatic backing. Connection: These states either do business with Zimbabwe’s ruling clique or provide platforms for them. China’s companies partner in mining and infrastructure (often joint ventures with Zimbabwe’s army or elite). Russia provides political backing and receives mining rights (a symbiotic exchange). South Africa and neighbors enable trade and transportation (e.g., Zimbabwean minerals travel through Durban; elites own homes in Johannesburg). The UAE buys gold and could host Zimbabwean financial offshore accounts. This network of states is as important as the criminal network – it’s the formal superstructure that allows the illicit flows to happen with minimal interference.
To visualize the full scope: imagine Mnangagwa at the center of a web. One strand connects to business cronies like Tagwirei and Rautenbach, who then connect onward to offshore companies (Mauritius, Cayman) and foreign firms (Trafigura, etc.) – this covers the corporate and financial aspect. Another strand connects to smugglers and fixers like Angel and Rushwaya, extending to Dubai’s gold market and underworld figures – this covers the black-market money flows. Surrounding Mnangagwa are also political allies – the governments of China, Russia, regional neighbors – forming a protective ring that overlaps with the business interests (e.g., Chinese and Russian companies in Zimbabwe blur the line between ally and profiteer). At each node of this network, there are individuals or entities who gain, and Mnangagwa’s continued rule is the linchpin holding it together.
Below is a summary map of major cross-border links, illustrating how state capture in Zimbabwe radiates internationally:
Zimbabwe ↔ DRC: joint military-business ventures (1998–2003) set precedent for continued partnerships; Zimbabwean businessmen like Rautenbach controlled DRC assets with Mnangagwa’s backing (Mnangagwa, Moyo and Shiri involved in DRC plunder – UN report - Zimbabwe Situation).
Zimbabwe ↔ Mauritius/Cayman: offshore shell companies (e.g. Sotic) hide Zimbabwean investments; used by Tagwirei to channel funds abroad and back (Fact Sheet English: Fronts, Fakes, and Façades).
Zimbabwe ↔ UAE: gold smuggling route; UAE buys gold and provides cash; Mnangagwa’s emissaries (Angel) operate here with high-level contacts (The Chronicle - Breaking news) (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera).
Zimbabwe ↔ China/Russia: political backing in exchange for investment deals (minerals-for-infrastructure, arms sales, etc.); top-level visits cement alliances (Zimbabwe's Mnangagwa hails Russia's Putin as 'my dear friend' and ally | Reuters).
Zimbabwe ↔ South Africa/Mozambique: neighbors act as transit and trade facilitators; no sanctions enforcement at borders; political solidarity shields Harare ( Zimbabwean president urges removal of U.S.-imposed sanctions-Xinhua ) ( Zimbabwean president urges removal of U.S.-imposed sanctions-Xinhua ).
Zimbabwe ↔ Offshore Finance (London/etc.): laundering of corruption proceeds into real estate and foreign bank accounts; often via third-country shells (e.g. Mauritius) to City of London as seen in Tagwirei’s mine purchase (Fact Sheet English: Fronts, Fakes, and Façades).
Each of these connections has allowed Mnangagwa and his associates to extract wealth from Zimbabwe and either store it abroad or use it to entrench their power. The cumulative effect by 2025 is that Zimbabwe’s state capture is not an isolated phenomenon; it is embedded in a regional and global network of corruption.
Conclusion
From war-time plunder in the DRC to sophisticated gold smuggling rings and offshore finance structures, Emmerson Mnangagwa’s rise to power and tenure as President have been underwritten by a far-reaching network of regional business and political connections. This deep-dive has shown how state capture in Zimbabwe (2017–2025) is reinforced by cross-border alliances: neighboring governments that turn a blind eye, global powers that offer support in exchange for access, and business proxies who move money seamlessly from Harare to Dubai to London. Mnangagwa’s family and loyalists are at the center of this web – profiteering from minerals, fuel, and forex scams at home, then parking the spoils in friendly foreign havens. The network map of companies, countries, and individuals linked to Mnangagwa reveals a convergence of interests: each node – be it a smuggler in Dubai, a shell company in Mauritius, or a politician in Beijing – derives benefit from the Mnangagwa regime’s continuation.
However, this sprawling network also exposes Mnangagwa’s vulnerabilities. It depends on the patronage of many actors; any break (for instance, stricter enforcement by an ally or a loss of trust by a proxy) could strain the system. The recent Global Magnitsky sanctions by the U.S. explicitly targeting Mnangagwa’s “criminal network” (Treasury Sanctions Zimbabwe’s President and Key Actors for Corruption and Serious Human Rights Abuse | U.S. Department of the Treasury) indicate growing international awareness of these connections. Whether that translates into effective action (e.g. the UAE clamping down on gold smuggling, or Mauritius tightening corporate secrecy) remains to be seen. For now, Mnangagwa has skillfully positioned himself at the nexus of regional politics and business, ensuring that his regime is both protected and enriched by a transnational cartel. This continuation of the 2017–2025 corruption investigation underscores that tackling Zimbabwe’s corruption is not merely a domestic affair – it will require unwinding a complex web of cross-border complicity that has empowered “the Crocodile” (Mnangagwa’s nickname) and his allies to capture a state and spread its spoils across the globe.
Sources:
UN Panel of Experts Report on DRC (2002) – Zimbabwean military-business networks (Mnangagwa, Moyo and Shiri involved in DRC plunder – UN report - Zimbabwe Situation) (Mnangagwa, Moyo and Shiri involved in DRC plunder – UN report - Zimbabwe Situation)
Mail & Guardian (Dec 2022) – Mnangagwa’s role in DRC resource deals (In the DRC, an ugly history of war risks repeating itself – The Mail & Guardian)
Zimbabwe Situation (Dec 2017) – Summary of UN findings on Mnangagwa in DRC war (Mnangagwa, Moyo and Shiri involved in DRC plunder – UN report - Zimbabwe Situation)
Africa Confidential (Dec 2018) – Mnangagwa’s Mozambique oil pipeline plans ( Mnangagwa wants his pipeline | Article Preview | Africa Confidential) ( Mnangagwa wants his pipeline | Article Preview | Africa Confidential)
Reuters (June 2024) – Mnangagwa on Russia as an ally (St. Petersburg Forum) (Zimbabwe's Mnangagwa hails Russia's Putin as 'my dear friend' and ally | Reuters)
Xinhua (Oct 2024) – SADC support for Zim against sanctions (Mnangagwa remarks) ( Zimbabwean president urges removal of U.S.-imposed sanctions-Xinhua ) ( Zimbabwean president urges removal of U.S.-imposed sanctions-Xinhua )
Al Jazeera Investigations (Apr 2023) – “Gold Mafia” expose linking Mnangagwa to smugglers (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera) (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera)
Al Jazeera Infographic (Apr 14, 2023) – “Emmerson ‘Number One’ Mnangagwa” gold smuggling network (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera) (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera)
OCCRP (Oct 2021) – Tagwirei’s Trafigura partnership and shift to Mauritius (How a Zimbabwe Tycoon Made a Fortune from a Trafigura Partnership and Spiralling National Debt | OCCRP) (How a Zimbabwe Tycoon Made a Fortune from a Trafigura Partnership and Spiralling National Debt | OCCRP)
The Sentry Report (July 2021) – Tagwirei’s offshore business empire (Mauritius, Cayman) (Shadows and Shell Games - The Sentry) (Fact Sheet English: Fronts, Fakes, and Façades)
U.S. Treasury Press Release (Aug 2020) – Sanctions on Kudakwashe Tagwirei (association with Mnangagwa) (Treasury Sanctions Corrupt Zimbabwean Businessman | U.S. Department of the Treasury) (Treasury Sanctions Corrupt Zimbabwean Businessman | U.S. Department of the Treasury)
U.S. Treasury Press Release (March 2024) – Global Magnitsky sanctions (Mnangagwa’s network, gold/diamond smuggling) (Treasury Sanctions Zimbabwe’s President and Key Actors for Corruption and Serious Human Rights Abuse | U.S. Department of the Treasury) (Treasury Sanctions Zimbabwe’s President and Key Actors for Corruption and Serious Human Rights Abuse | U.S. Department of the Treasury)
Chronicle (Zimbabwe) (Feb 2024) – Mnangagwa in UAE discussing mineral trade via DMCC (The Chronicle - Breaking news) (The Chronicle - Breaking news)
Zimbabwe Sunday Mail (2022) – Mnangagwa’s state visit to Kenya (signing of MOUs) (Zim, Kenya sign eight MoUs - Harare - The Sunday Mail)
Al Jazeera (Investigation report) – Statements by gold smugglers (Macmillan, Angel) about Mnangagwa’s involvement (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera) (Is Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa behind gold smuggling? | Investigation News | Al Jazeera)
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